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ABSTRACT 
The dissertation focuses on the multiple 
reorganizations of Manufacturers Hanover between March 1985 
and June 1991. The research sought to find a relationship with 
the reorganizations and the stock price and performance 
measures of the Bank. The purpose was to determine if the 
reorganizations provided a measurable impact on the 
performance of the Bank. The conclusions of this research 
established that the reorganizations, if intended to improve 
the performance of the Bank, were not effective. 
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MANAGEMENT REORGANIZATIONS IN THE GLOBAL BANKS 
- A CASE STUDY 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Many of the world's major banks have engaged in 
numerous organizational restructurings over the last five 
years. These restructurings have fallen into three primary 
categories: 
i. Re-design: restructuring of the organizational 
structure of the institution by combining business 
units, splitting business units, eliminating 
business units, etc. 
ii. Vertical: redesignating the lines of authority, 
either passing greater responsibility down further 
in the organization, or moving it up further in 
the organization. 
111. Lateral: reorganization of·the management team, 
shifting responsibility from one senior manager to 
another, changing who is in charge of a given 
area. 
For the purposes of this paper the terms restructure 
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and reorganization refer to any one of these three events. 
Additionally; this research confines these events to 
publicly announced reorganizations that are significant in 
nature. Significance is determined by major reorganizations 
of the bank which is studied. The information, and choice 
of, these reorganizations were provided directly by the 
bank. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that major 
reorganizations have increased in frequency fairly steadily 
throughout the 1980's. This constant shifting of an 
organization, and the power structures within it, leaves the 
purpose of that shifting elusive. It begs the question of 
whether or not management is clear on what direction they 
wish to take the organization. However, the purpose and 
effectiveness of the restructuring is of major concern to 
many different parties. These include the public at large, 
the shareholders, the stakeholders, the users of banks, etc. 
They should be concerned with the reason an organization has 
so many internal changes, and whether or not these changes 
are diverting the organization's focus from its true 
mission. 
Some possible reasons for restructuring activity may 
be: 
The financial world, and the outside influences 
upon it, have become so volatile that a financial 
institution must update its structure frequently 
in order to maintain pace with the environment. 
Management must tailor the organization in order 
to provide superior service to its client base. 
Management has not tuned in to the current 
structures dictated by the market. They are 
predominantly not equipped to deal with the 
changes in today's financial environment, and so 
continually re-define their business. 
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Management is inwardly focused and restructures in 
order to deliver the short-term results which 
shareholders, stakeholders, and the bankers want. 
The reason for any organizational restructuring must 
be to increase the effectiveness of the organization, and 
ultimately the value of that corporation. The difficulty is 
how effectiveness may be accurately measured. It is 
important to measure the effectiveness in order to equip the 
organization with the ability to continue to deal with 
future change. This dissertation explores restructuring in 
terms of the Banking Industry, and seeks to explain whether 
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the multiple reorganizations of one bank were effective. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Commercial banks have experienced turbulent times. 
This turbulence has had a major impact on the stock price, 
earnings and credit ratings of these banks (read their 
ability to cheaply fund their assets). One of management's 
responses has been to restructure the firm. Restructuring 
has taken various forms, breaking into three primary types 
of restructuring; organizational, authority and operational. 
The restructuring at most banks has not been a one-time 
event, but has developed into a series of restructurings, 
which appear to attempt to counter the increasing volatility 
of the financial markets. However, does this ·restructuring 
create value? 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
To gain an understanding of the value of the 
organizational restructuring of global banks, and to explore 
its suitability as a response to market changes. The 
research question being posed in this study specifically 
concerns the management restructuring of the global banks. 
The question is: Are management restructurings of global 
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banks effective? Posing this question implies that we can 
test the impact of the restructuring. What impact should be 
looked at? The view of the study is to explore the impact to 
the shareholders of the banks as well as the stakeholders of 
the organization. The act of restructuring itself poses many 
questions. Why does a bank restructure its management? What 
does the bank use as criteria for understanding the 
effectiveness of its current organizational structure? What 
is the vision when a bank chooses a new organizational 
structure? The research undertaken explores relationships 
between announced reorganizations, and financial trends in 
the industry by analyzing data from one bank on its 
reorganizations and its performance. The data is compared to 
control groups. In general, management focuses on improving 
stock price as a measure of success. As banks have been 
hammered by problem after problem (bad loans, misplaced 
research and development), management's focus has been on 
the organization's structure as the way to fix these 
problems. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
It is the contention of the author that the 
rationale for the organizational restructuring of any 
institution should have as its premise increasing the 
shareholder value of the organization, as well as increasing 
the benefits to the institution's stakeholders. The 
stakeholders include the employees of the organization, as 
well as the direct clients of the institution and the 
indirect beneficiaries such as shareholders in client 
institutions and suppliers - third party contractors. It is 
assumed that multiple reorganizations over a very short 
period of time are also directed at increasing the value of 
the firm. If the reorganizations are effective, the results 
should be visible and comparable to industry peers. The 
reorganizations should either slow down a negative trend, 
reverse a negative trend, or speed a positive trend, in 
terms of an institution's performance. 
RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROBLEM TO SOCIAL CHANGE 
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Restructuring as a response to changing financial 
markets has thrown a degree of uncertainty into the 
financial industry which has not been experienced since the 
regulation of the industry in the thirties. In order to 
survive the banking industry must learn new ways to work, to 
educate its people, and to embrace the discontinuity of the 
times. 
The restructurings which are occurring within the 
industry are creating new attitudes toward work at these 
financial institutions. The study which was conducted 
explored whether the reorganizations at the Manufacturers 
Hanover Corporation (the Bank) provided any impact on the 
performance of the bank. To the extent that reorganizations 
improve a the performance of an organization they should 
decrease the uncertainty surrounding the institution. This 
should have the result of increasing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the institution and, as a result, make it a 
more secure place to work. 
The reorganization of the major banks around the 
world has a direct impact on the employment levels at those 
institutions. While it is not covered in this study, the 
relationship of constant reorganization to employee morale 
is an area that demands attention. The question that will 
need to be addressed is: What is the impact on society of 
massive layoffs, and job insecurity resulting from the 
announced reorganization of the world's major banking 
institutions? A study to research these questions would be 
conducted by interviewing employees of the banks undergoing 
7 
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the restructurings,as well as some of the employees who have 
lost their jobs as a result of the restructure. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
This section explores the current issues in banking 
industry, and provides topical background for the 
dissertation. The problem which is explored relates to the 
value of the restructuring of the global banks. This problem 
is described in introduction of this paper. However; in 
order to gain an appreciation for the problem, it is 
important to become familiar with the issues which have 
surrounded the banking industry over the last decade, and 
which continue to affect the industry today. The 
dissertation measures, or gives value to, the organizational 
restructurings which have become a frequent occurrence 
within the global banks. This section provides background on 
the financial environment which has been in existence during 
these times of change, and presents an understanding of what 
the restructuring activity may be attempting to accomplish. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. 
A. The current financial environment and the financial 
conditions of the banking industry at large are 
presented. While this section does not attempt to prove 
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any relationship between the increased volatility in 
the financial environment, decreased regulations of 
banks, and the decline in the financial health of the 
banking industry, it does suggest an understanding of 
the historical happenings and discusses events which 
have fundamentally changed the financial environment. 
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B. The trends in the banking industry as well as the 
compatibility of banks, as we traditionally think of 
them, are discussed within the context of the current 
environment. The changing world has brought forth 
continued and rapid disintermediation within the 
industry, and a need, due to changing regulations, for 
banks to focus on turning the downward trend around. 
C. Management issues in turbulent times explores the 
issue of the necessity of banks. In today•s world do 
banks provide any •value•, do they add value, or are 
they simply anachronistic leftovers of the past 
financial world? While there are no clear cut answers 
to these large issues, it is clear that they are issues 
which need to be constantly focused on by the 
managements of today•s financial institutions. 
D. Reorganization influences and issues are highlighted 
in a discussion of the factors that may affect 
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decisions on how to reorganize an institution. Banks 
not only have to deal with the changing environment, 
and turning around an industry-wide downtrend in the 
industry, they also have to deal with the regulators in 
the various countries. Governments, and the approaches 
to save the world financial system, have to be 
accounted for in determining the business of the bank. 
A. THE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
The financial environment has become at the same 
time more volatile, deregulated, and disintermediated. One 
problem that banks have had to face is the constraints of 
regulations while at the same time trying to carve out a 
defined business and maintain their earnings levels. All 
this while the markets have expanded in terms of financial 
market participants. Meanwhile, markets continue to become 
more conscious of the increasing credit risk embodied in the 
banking system, exacerbating the bank's efforts to 
increase,or even maintain, traditional core business. 
Financial volatility has increased worldwide. This 
fact may be seen simply by observing the movement of the 
stock market in any developed country, or the price movement 
of government obligations on futures exchanges, or the cost 
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of corporate debt over the past decade. In Chapter 1 of 
Managing Financial Risk, Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Charles W. 
Smithson and D. Sykes Wilford1 demonstrate the increased 
volatility of financial price risk, defined as changes in 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, or commodity prices. 
They relate this increased volatility back to changes in 
regulations such as; the demise of the Bretton Woods system 
which sent foreign exchange rates floating. To the extent 
that a business cannot be assured of the price of imports or 
exports, and to the extent that a business cannot estimate 
the degree to which changes in foreign exchange rates will 
make their product more or less competitive in their home 
market due to cheaper imports, this volatility has caused 
increased uncertainty. The banks have been caught in this 
event by virtue of the fact that banks have historically 
been the clearing house for foreign exchange transactions. 
This also means that corporations are forced to deal with 
the banks. As the market became increasingly volatile, 
through the seventies and eighties, banks wanting to 
preserve their corporate business, by necessity were forced 
to become more innovative, creating new products and 
competing with each other for the business. 
Now, in order to maintain their position in the 
foreign exchange business, banks could no longer remain 
complacent. Banks could no longer only accept the 
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intermediary function in the clearing of foreign exchange, 
but were beginning the move towards becoming providers of 
current information, which drives the price of currency 
transactions. Bankers would need to develop a sense of the 
economic interrelationships of the various developed nations 
around the world. There are now a vast variety of products 
available from banks to deal with the issues of foreign 
exchange rate volatility. These products range from the 
mundane foreign exchange forward contract to the exotic 
long-term option variations. The offering of these products 
has considerably complicated the issues of marketing and 
defining business objectives for banks. 
Similar situations have arisen in areas of interest 
rate volatility. This volatility may be traced in the United 
States to October, 1979 when Paul Volker, then the Chairman 
of The Federal Reserve Bank, allowed interest rates to move 
freely. Banks then had to cope with drastic changes to their 
most fundamental business. Interest rates for both funding 
and lending of money were affected. Banks began competing 
not only for the intermediation of funds but also for 
advisory roles dealing with the prediction and management of 
interest rate movements. Banks were in hot competition for 
the creation of innovative products which corporations were 
demanding of their bankers in order to cope with the new 
financial environment. 
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Certain other occurrences in the markets, at this 
time, cannot be ignored. For example, the continued entrance 
of other players. This change in the environment may be seen 
on many levels. One is in the competition for funds. No 
longer are banks the only repositories. Insurance companies, 
the trend to one-name paper, expanding bonds markets, etc. 
all placed pressure on the banks, and served to increase the 
volatility and competitiveness of the financial industry. 
ONE NAME PAPER MARKETS AND NEW PROVIDERS OF CAPITAL 
As an example, look at the largest of the short-term 
capital markets, the US commercial paper market. It has 
grown from approximately $300 billion to approximately $650 
billion over a period of eight years. 2 This is significant 
when one considers that the participants are some of the 
highest rated companies in the world. Ten years ago these 
companies borrowed from the banking industry. Five years ago 
the same companies worked with the investment banks to place 
their paper with investors, thus by-passing the commercial 
banks. Now those same companies issue their commercial paper 
• 
directly to investors, cutting out all forms of 
intermediation in the process of raising capital. 3 
The market for capital has grown at a tremendous 
pace over the past few years. Corporations can readily 
access capital from the commercial paper market, the 
eurocommercial paper market, the private placement market, 
the bond market", as well as various capital markets in 
foreign countries. Corporations have also found innovative 
ways to encourage investors to place capital with them. 
Innovation in these markets is demonstrated by the current 
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trend towards asset securitization. While banks participate 
in these markets, it is not only the province of banks. 
Insurance companies, finance companies, owned by some of the 
world's largest corporations such as, General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation, and General Electric Capital 
Corporation•, also participate. This places increased 
pressures on the banks as they expand their lines of 
business while contending with increased competition from 
outside of their industry. 5 
Additionally, it should be remembered that Federal 
regulations in the United States, and regulations in some 
other countries, prohibit banks from participating in many 
"These capital markets access capital from differing 
investor bases with different requirements. The commercial 
paper market is a us based market for short-term unsecured 
borrowings. The euro-commercial paper market is similar to 
the US but represents offshore funds, it is centered in 
London. The private placement market is typically used for 
long-term borrowings by companies not wanting to provide 
full disclosure of their financials on a wide spread basis. 
The bond market provides long-term funding for companies, 
but requires public disclosure of financials. 
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of these markets.b The higher quality credits were 
nat~rally drawn to emerging innovative markets, where there 
was cheaper pricing because of strong competition, and the 
lesser quality credits remained the province of the 
commercial banks. Thus, the banks lost many of their 
borrowers to the innovative and growing markets at the same 
time that new entrants were coming into the financial 
services arena. This left more competitors, and fewer 
corporations desiring capital but the corporations are lower 
quality. 
As the good borrowers move into emerging markets, 
seeking funds cheaply in these highly competitive markets, 
the banks are at a loss to compete profitably. Because of 
the declining credit ratings of the banking industry, many 
banks find it difficult to raise funds cheaper than the cost 
of the very corporations with which they are seeking to do 
business. Additionally, the regulatory powers of the major 
countries have banded together to attempt to control a 
potential world financial crisis, by shoring-up the banking 
industry, and have introduced certain capital 
requirements.• These capitalization requirements will make 
the cost of funds for banks generally more expensive. Again, 
b In the US, banks with commercial banki~g lic~nses ar~ 
not permitted to provide funds for the~r cl~ents by 
assisting them in the issuance of bonds, although on a case 
by case basis this is beginning to change. 
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this removes some of the competitiveness from the banking 
industry making it more difficult to lend money, and forcing 
banks to find other lines of business. Restructurings in the 
banking industry surely must be occurring to address many of 
these issues, forcing the banks to attempt to be more 
competitive, and therefore more profitable. 
LBO BOOM AND BUST 
The Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO'S) era of the 1980's is 
significant when attempting to understand the financial 
environment which is at least in part, behind the announced 
reorganizations. While the idea of the leveraged buyout is 
not new, the amount of the activity and the contribution of 
this technique to the volume of merger related activity that 
occurred in the 1980s was significant. Gibson Greeting Cards 
is considered to mark the beginning of the era. A group of 
investors bought Gibson from RCA Corporation in 1981 and 
within 18 months sold Gibson to the public. In this 18 month 
span the investor group netted a profit of $250 million. 
LBOs became very advantageous to the investors involved in 
initiating them. 
The important thing, for our purposes, is to 
understand the underlying concept of the LBO. That is; an 
undervalued company is taken private, or bought by a group 
of investors, rejuvenated and then sold. The financing is 
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done by borrowing. The amount of LBO activity significantly 
increased bank lending in this period. 
LBO volume increased the volume of the merger 
activity by a third in the 1980's. 
Chart 1, LBO Activity 
Year Volume by Dollars Number of LBOs 
1980 $2.0 billion Not available 
1984 $11.8 billion 76 LEOs 
1986 $37.6 billion 212 LEOs 
1988 $81.2 billion 239 LEOs (40% of 
merger activity) 
(source: Smith, R.C., 1990, chapter 6.) 
The one important feature from the point of view of 
the banks that were providing the financing is that the debt 
was not guaranteed. Although security in the assets was 
provided, the value of that security was not assured. 
After 1986 the transaction size increased, more 
players entered the market, banks increased staff to handle 
the deal flow, and the market became fully priced. There was 
seemingly unlimited amounts of funds available from the 
banks and the junk bond marketc. Even, the stock market 
c The junk bond market provided funds to borrowers who 
typically, because of credit quality, could not access the 
public bond market. This market provided these funds but at 
a very high cost. 
crash of 1987 appeared to have no effect on the volume of 
transactions which were pushed through the market. 
However; in 1988, marked by Revcod, the first 
collapse of an LBO, the market began to change. By 1989 
banks were concerned with the increasing defaults in this 
sector and with the collapse of the junk bond market and 
began to pull back. 7 
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Consequently, we can see the growth and decline of a 
market in less than a decade. This is only one of the events 
in the financial environment that has been an influence on 
the reorganizations of banks. The first major event was to 
cope with the expanding market; the second was to cope with 
the declining and deteriorating (from a credit standpoint) 
market. It also is worth noting that the lending 
opportunities which the LBO phenomena presented came at the 
time when the third world debt crisis was beginning to slow 
down the international lending activities of the 
international banks. Also, in this vein, the activity in the 
real estate financing sector should not be ignored. The 
ramifications of this activity, following, and overlapping, 
the LBO activity are just beginning to be understood. 
d Prior to the bankruptcy filing of Revco a drug 
store chain based in Ohio), an LBO, the market for LBO'S had 
not experienced any failings. After this filing the market 
became more cautious in terms of the types of LBOs it would 
accept. 
The final factor, which needs to be mentioned, in 
terms of the financial environment in the 1980s, is the 
increasing presence of technology in banking. The very 
nature of. finance was changed by the computer in the 
1980s. 8 This may be seen both in the speed with which 
prices of capital move around the world, as well as in the 
product offering themselves. Prior to the incorporation of 
the computer into the world of banking it would have been 
impossible to attempt the construction of sophisticated 
products such as asset securitization and cross-currency 
swaps which are today constructed and sold as a mundane 
matter of course. This technology opened the door to once 
more expand the banks' business line. 
19 
20 
Chart 2 A general overview of change in the financial environment 
' 
Circa Events Events Events 
1971 Foreign exchange rates set 
floating 
1974 REIT Bankruptcies 
1979 u.s. interest rates freed Walter Wriston 
states that 
governments 
never go 
bankrupt. 
1981 Interest rate swaps, Gibson Greeting 
eurodollar futures market, IBM card, 
pc successful LBO, 
marked the 
1982 Information era intensifies, Third world beginning of the 
ECP market emerges, eurobond debt crisis era 
market takes off 
1985 FRNs, option products, money 
center banks begin to lose 
their high credit ratings 
1987 Stock Market crash, capital Trading of 
adequacy requirements third world 
debt, debt 
equity swaps. 
1988 RJR $25billion 
buyout, the 
biggest. 
1989 Mini-crash of the stock market UAL buyout 
fails, junk 
market collapse, 
the end of the 
boom 
1990 Eastern europe opens for 
business, rule 144a threatens 
to revolutionize the capital 
markets, Iraq throws the 
markets into turmoil 
This chart highlights only some of the events in the 
financial environment which have had a fundamental impact on 
the nature of the banking industry. The curve of financial 
innovation took a decidedly upward turn in the 1980s, after 
centuries of relative passivity (see APPENDIX I). Bankers 
and bank management have had to learn to deal with an 
increasingly volatile and changing world, and have been 
challenged to adapt their profession and institutions to 
deal with this new world. 
B. TRENDS IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
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A bank is defined in the Webster Dictionary as •an 
establishment for the custody of money received from, or on 
behalf of, its customers. Its essentia1 duty is to pay their 
drafts on it; its profits arise from the use of money left 
unemployed by them•. Were the world a stable place, and had 
the financial environment not changed dramatically, this 
definition would suffice just fine. Banks, in their 
traditional role did, just that. They would take in money 
and seek to lend it out. Because of regulation governing the 
maximum rates on the deposit side, profit was built-in. This 
is easily demonstrated by looking at the U.S. Savings and 
Loan (S&L) crisis. 9 Also, because of a lack of developed 
financial markets and the existence of protecting 
regulations, banks were almost assured of demand for their 
products. These two reasons provided banks a place in the 
financial industry, as financial intermediary, that was 
profitable and geared towards unlimited growth. This led to 
bank industry, and bank management complacency. 
There have been several negative trends in banking 
over the last decade or so. These trends include the 
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downgrading of banks by the rating agencies, the increase in 
bad debts, notably the Third World Debt crisis, and recent 
defaults of some of the major leveraged buyouts of the late 
1980s. This has caused a decrease in profitability of the 
banking industry worldwide. 10 Anecdotal evidence from the 
financial press also indicates a continuing trend of banks 
to act as a herd or group. This appears both in the type of 
transactions which banks are entering into, as well as the 
management reshuffling, restructuring, firing employees, 
layoffs, etc. It is interesting to note the herd trend in 
banking. It seems to be traceable from one incident to the 
next. Back in the 1970's in the United States, banks were 
most anxious to lend to the Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
Most major banks were involved in this action. The lending 
continued until there was a rash of defaults. Next, banks 
lent heavily to the Third World countries. Banks then lent 
heavily into the leveraging phenomena of the 1980's. In all 
these cases the incentive to do the transaction was the 
desire to earn large fees for putting the transaction 
together. The results in all cases were over-lending, and 
then many defaults. This was followed by a reluctance of the 
banking industry to continue to lend in this venue, and on 
to the next trend. 
The damage which these trends have caused in the 
banking industry is reflected in the trends of the banks' 
23 
credit standings, and in the very continued existence of the 
banks themselves. 
A full 25 percent of the largest U.S. banking 
companies in existence in 1980 are gone today. 11 In 1980 
most of the major U.S. money center banks had the highest 
ratings achievable in the credit markets for both long-term 
and short-term debt. Most of the major international banks 
also had extremely high credit ratings. Today in the world, 
there are only five global banks which have been able to 
maintain the highest, AAA/aaa", ratings. The coincidence 
of the herd trend, and the downgrading, and loss of credit 
status is remarkable. The impact will be felt for years, 
although we can see the results of the debt write-offs, 
resulting downsizing, and overall decline of market value 
now. 
• These are Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, Deutsche 
Bank AG, The Royal Bank of Canada, Rabobank Nederland, and 
Society General Bank (France) . 
24 
,.,..,,., (7 11110 
M (35.01() 
A (~1.01() 
Figure l Credit Ratings 1991 
25 
M (43.011) 
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Twenty five percent of the banking system in the 
U.S.,representing assets of more than $750 billion, has 
begun to post such huge losses that the focus of the banks 
has gone towards collecting these loans as opposed to 
concentrating on the opportunities which will bring back 
12 f . profitability to the system. I management 1s 
concentrating on fixing the problems, then the attention is 
not on how to deal with this changing environment, or on 
reversing the change in profitability. 
The average return on equity of American banks is 
said to be less than 7%. 13 Based on a 1989 survey by 
banking consultant David C. Cates, the ten largest finance 
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companies earned shareholders a 12.7% return on equity. The 
big U.S. commercial banks meanwhile earned only 0.4% return 
on equity. Clearly, the return achieved by the big banks is 
not in line with the competitors which are creeping into the 
market. Also, clearly the big banks appear to weight the 
average return of the industry down. This lack of 
profitability and loss of credit rating is also a motivation 
for reorganizing an institution. The rationale is that 
management is seeking some way to show improvement, and to 
turn around a trend. 
C. MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN TURBULENT TIMES 
The banking industry is in the midst of unparalleled 
change, both in terms of direction and pace. Bank management 
has thus far dealt with this new, and evolving environment 
by realigning, reshuffling, and redefining business units. 
This action has failed to address or alter the industry's 
inability to deal with change. According to some, the 
industry is only beginning to restructure based on balancing 
14 ' 
supply and demand. Whether banks should or should not 
reorganize, and specifically which banks should, is not an 
issue which can be currently answered. However; one of the 
factors facing bank management today is: What should the 
bank do in relation to its competitors?15 What is clear is, 
that regardless of the direction chosen, management must 
determine a strategy, and then test the proposed strategic 
goals and internal policy for consistency with that 
strategy. 16 
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As Porter17 suggests, a firm may chose any one of 
three generic strategies with which to compete. They 
include, cost, leadership, differentiation, and focus. "Any 
firm failing to develop its strategy in at least one of 
these directions is in an extremely poor strategic 
position•, (Porter, 1980, p. 41). That banks in general have 
apparently failed this basic tenet of a consistent strategic 
plan is marked by the poor profits in the industry, as well 
as the many reorganizations that have become a part of the 
industry. Bank management will need to grasp the issues of 
the future and reconcile the strategic direction of the bank 
with the move toward a global economy and increased 
internationalization of banking and finance. 18 There is a 
move towards the universal bank, and management must create 
a structure that will deal effectively with a rapidly 
changing environment, without the need to constantly change 
the structure. There is also the issue of regulatory 
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pressures, these have been mentioned in section B., and are 
further explored in section D. 
The inability of the major banks to pick a 
consistent strategic plan is marked by observation of the 
declining industry profitability, 19 the declining industry 
credit ratings, 20 and the incessant announcements of 
further downsizing. In order to survive, banks will need to 
develop the ability to effectively cope with change. They 
must develop futuristic vision, and a formula for survival 
with return to profitability. 21 To do this, management must 
focus on several key questions. 
The first question which must be answered by bank 
management is; on the macro level - why are banks necessary? 
on the micro level - why is my bank necessary?22 What can 
my institution provide that isn't well provided for by some 
other institution? 
On the next level the questions are; what is the 
financial environment dictating about the need for banks in 
the future? Can we read the environment we live in, read the 
trend in the markets and be better able to determine the 
fate of banking, breaking the herd mentality? 
Also, management will need to consider; what must 
I 
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the banker be able to do in order to be successful? This 
helps define the characteristics of who should be a banker, 
and the amount of responsibility which will have to be 
downstreamed in order for the banker to be successful. 
Once these fundamental questions are addressed then 
management can begin to define its business unit structure 
and then the management structure that is dictated to 
support and manage that structure. And, then restructure the 
institution so that it supports what its function is defined 
as. It is clear though that these issues must be addressed 
and that focus must be determined. 23 
Why are banks necessary? Some of the answers most 
commonly given by bankers themselves really address the need 
• 24 for banks from an historical perspect1ve. The answers 
also seem to demonstrate the lack of focus given by bank 
management today to their bankers, and therefore perhaps the 
lack of focus that bank management has been able to develop 
itself. All seem to agree on the fundamental need of a 
banking system to provide retail financial services for 
individuals. However, on the commercial or business services 
sector there is not much consistency or faith in its 
existence. 
Banks are necessary to: 
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- provide an intermediary function in moving funds 
- clear funds and foreign exchange transactions 
- lend money, etc. 
- provide advice and information. 
This is an ideal question for every industry, and 
particularly those in management to ask themselves 
frequently. Given the changes in the financial world over 
the last decade, not one of the reasons provided above 
appear to justify the necessity of a bank's existence. 
Furthermore; given the general deterioration of the credit 
rating of banks25 , banks may no longer be a safe place to 
deposit money. In order to prepare for the future, bank 
management, and bankers, need to be able to understand why 
their business is needed, what that business is, and how to 
develop and maintain the skills which· will be necessary to 
compete. 
Bank management needs to be able to answer this 
question before doing any more management restructuring, 
before they continue to hire and fire at rapid pace as they 
shift from one strategic direction to the next, and before 
they reshuffle and further demoralize the bankers 
themselves . 26 
One of the fundamental, frequently mentioned 
problems is overcapacity in the industry. 27 Before 
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exploring whether or not there are too many banks, the first 
issue that should be explored is not the number of banks, 
but the fact that the banks fundamentally all offer the same 
products to the same customer base. 
The traditional role of banks has been that of 
intermediaries in the financial markets; taking in money in 
the form of deposits, whether on the retail level or from a 
corporate or funded base, and lending out these funds in 
order to finance the growth, hopes, and dreams of the world. 
For years, as previously discussed, banks were the primary 
source of funding for projects. The past few decades, and in 
particular over the course of the 1980's, at an accelerated 
pace, the capital markets throughout the world have been 
growing up and to a large extent replacing banks as a source 
of funds. The banks have also been frustrated by, in many 
countries, prohibition on entering into these capital 
markets by government regulations. Management must determine 
the new role of the bank in the existing financial 
environment. 
Management must then find a formula for change, 
which should start with an understanding of the changes in 
existence within the financial environment. 28 The issues 
surrounding a banking reorganization are formidable, and 
therefore demand to be addressed. 
D. REORGANIZATION INFLUENCES AND ISSUES 
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As the financial markets get more competitive and 
volatile, and the trend in the banking industry continues to 
decline, we see that management needs to take charge of the 
strategic focus of the institution, and decide what the 
appropriate direction will be for their institution. There 
have been numerous reorganizations that are directed to 
coping with change in this increasingly complex world. All 
banks are attempting to cut costs while at the same time 
they are seeking to find income from new areas. Most banks 
are putting their operations under a microscope to attempt 
to determine what line of business(es) they should be in, 
and where they may have a competitive advantage. 29 Other 
issues in the reorganization of a banking institution will 
need to deal with the globalization of the world, including 
specifically the changing financial industry, the creation 
of the European market in 1992, and the progress of 
technology. 
Additionally, there are movements within the 
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industry to change the regulations that govern the banks' 
activities. These movements are driven by both the banks and 
by governments, and are occurring in many countries. One 
such event is the capital adequacy requirements which were 
decided on in the late 1980's, and are being phased in by 
1992. These regulations require a bank to maintain a certain 
amount of capital against on-balance sheet and off-balance 
sheet activities. The requirements attempt to address the 
risk of the bank's business. There have been calls for major 
financial restructuring of the system in the U.S. banking 
sector. These vary from a total revamping of the insurance 
of bank deposits to a major restructuring of the money 
center banks' business'. 30 
So banks, when dealing with the issues of change and 
volatility in the financial market must also be cognizant of 
the governmental influences on their business. 
Reorganization, or restructuring, must take all of these 
factors into account. Recognizing these factors has been the 
reason why some institutions have decided to concentrate on 
selected market niches, no longer being all things to all 
clients. This concentration is the banks attempt to carve 
out a profitable piece of business. Perhaps, this is how 
f . Money center banks are defined by the Federal Reserve 
bank as the largest banks in certain key cities. See 
APPENDIX II for a listing of the money center banks analyzed 
for this paper. 
banks will have to be organized in the future. However, it 
is clear that there are many factors which are affecting 
bank management's decisions on reorganizations. While 
reorganization may be viewed as a way to survive as an on-
going concern, 31 reorganizations are also considered by 
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many in the industry to be a contributing factor to the 
increasing turbulence within the banking industry. It may be 
worthwhile to take the theories of Porter, Bettinger, 
Peters, 32 and others to heart and focus on a clear 
consistent strategy that, while flexible, is well 
communicated and visibly supported by management. 
There is a group of excellent banksg, defined by 
Stephen Davis33in his work. While the structures and 
strategies of this group of banks appears to vary greatly, 
each bank has in common, a clear, consistent strategy that 
is well communicated both internally, and externallyh. The 
reorganizations of the international banks may be attempts 
to duplicate these models of excellency. 
g The excellent banks have been those with above 
average financial performance as well as ,those judged by a 
panel of 'bank watchers• made up of banking professionals. 
Consistently on this list are J.P. Morgan & Co. . and The 
Banker Trust Company, among others from around the world. 
h Davis has found that the comm~n thread of the 
excellent banks is that everyone knows what the business 
strategy of the institution is. This includes the workers of 
the institution as well as the clients. 
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CONCLUSION 
The financial world has changed more, and faster, in 
the last ten years than at any other time in history. Bank 
management needs to be well focused on the change in this 
environment and be able to provide the vision and leadership 
that will be necessary to be a bank of the future. To the 
extent that a bank does not have a clearly defined focus and 
strategy, and this focus and strategy is not clearly 
communicated to its people, the bank will fail. That is, the 
bank will not provide adequate returns to investors and 
stakeholders, and will eventually cease to exist. 
Additionally, bank management must be well focused on the 
continuous development of its people, providing them with 
the support and knowledge to change and succeed in their 
environment. 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
INQUIRY STRATEGIES 
The inquiry strategy was based on the case study 
method. It entailed a multi-factor approach. In order to 
gain a clear picture of the effect of the actions, the basic 
research question was examined from several angles. We must 
be able to view the impact of reorganizations from the stand 
point of the shareholders, and from the point of view of the 
stakeholders. A variety of objective data was examined. The 
data consisted of: stock price, credit ratings, employee 
levels, and performance indicators. The data was analyzed to 
see if a correspondence existed between an announced 
reorganization and changes in the share price or performance 
of the organization. This data is historical in nature and 
was compared to an industry average. Within the industry, 
control was established by using institutions from similar 
markets, e.g., only international banks of a certain size 
(see APPENDIX II). 
The research methodology utilized in the study was a 
combination of; historical, correlation, and regression 
analysis. The question posed is specific, and has practical 
and sociological implications. Therefore, it would be an 
error to assume that one method of measure of this complex 
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question would give a clear picture of the measure of 
success. It was the intention of the study to bring several 
diverse measures together drawing conclusions separately 
from each, but then interpreting an overall conclusion from 
the diverse parts. This was necessary because of the many 
internal and external factors which must be considered in 
unison. Within a volatile environment is the short-term 
stock price an appropriate measure? cost of debt? credit 
ratings? shareholder opinions? employee attitudes? A long-
term trend? What is an appropriate control group? Has the 
organizational restructuring been successful if the 
organization survives, but does not appear to currently 
prosper? The author intended to take a broad view of these 
questions, but concentrated on beginning the process of data 
collection and measurement, in order to some day answer the 
above questions. The first step in understanding this 
process was to establish whether or not the announced 
reorganizations have any relationship to the performance of 
the organization. It is this first step with which the 
research methodology concerned itself. 
There are many factors which impact the measure of 
effectiveness, particularly in the case of the world's major 
banking institutions. The financial environment has changed 
in the past decade perhaps faster and more dramatically than 
ever before. Some of the events changing the environment 
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include: the LDC loan defaults, the phenomena of the highly 
leveraged transactions, increased interest rate volatility, 
increased foreign exchange volatility, the new derivative 
products, and the age of the banker product specialist. All 
of these factors need to be considered when analyzing a 
bank's motive for restructuring, and to be remembered when 
attempting to ascertain the effectiveness of that 
restructuring. All of those factors, and more, have led to 
radical changes within the financial industry, including 
that of job instability. All of those factors make the 
measurement of the impact of an organizational restructure 
that much more difficult. 
THE PROCEDURE 
a. INFORMATION STUDIED 
The data used in the study included, annual reports, 
industry analyst reports, news media, stock prices, and news 
releases. This includes the stock market information of 
several reputable firms such as Shearson Lehman Brothers. 
Step 1. Collection of the data on the reorganization 
activities of the bank. 
The first step centered on the gathering of data 
relating to the bank's reorganizations. The case study 
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focuses on one international bank, Manufacturers Hanover 
Corporation, and therefore the data was collected on the 
reorganizations of just this bank. The study explored data 
over a five year period. These dates encompassed 1985 
through June 1991. The sources for this data included 
professional journals, professional bank analyst firms, and 
bank annual reports and press releases. This step involved 
the codifying of the reorganizations. While there have been 
many reorganizations that have occurred in the bank over the 
past five years, it was the intention of the author to focus 
on the major reorganizations. This has been determined by 
the bank which was studied, and which supplied the 
information on the major reorganizations. 
Step 2. Stock price over the period of the study. 
From data resource retrieval the author obtained the 
stock price of the bank which is being studied. This price 
was obtained for the same period of time as the study. The 
stock price is an important component of the study. It is 
the return on the stock that has been a prime focus of the 
market. One of the value judgements that is placed on 
companies is whether their stock price goes up or down. As 
investors in an institution, we would clearly prefer for the 
stock price to appreciate. If the institution which we are 
investing in reorganizes, not once but a multiplicity of 
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times, we would clearly prefer that the stock price 
responded to the reorganization by increasing. This may be 
looked at in absolute terms of just the individual stock, or 
it may be looked at as an increase relative to the industry 
overall. 
Step 3. Other performance measures of the bank over the 
period of the study. 
Key performance measures dealing with how the bank 
has done over the period of the study were obtained 
primarily from annual audited reports of the company. The 
key measures looked at are: earnings per share (earnings 
divided by common shares outstanding), return on assets 
(earnings divided by total assets), and information on non-
performing debt (APPENDIX VI contains definitions of terms) . 
Credit ratings were obtained on the bank, tracking the 
period of the study. These performance measures are 
interrelated to some degree, and provide some balancing 
factors in the analysis of the bank which is being studied. 
While the stock price may go down, this may be because the 
entire stock market declined. We need to understand how 
financially strong the subject bank is and if the announced 
reorganizations have had an effect on its financial 
strength. These indicators allow for a comparison within the 
industry, as another means of tracking the trend of the 
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subject bank. 
Step 4. Information on number of employees, year on year of 
the bank. 
From public information, the staffing of the 
organization was obtained. It is clear from observation of 
the industry that cost cutting has been a prime focus of 
many of the banking organizations. Part and parcel of the 
announcement of many reorganizations is an adjustment of the 
staffing of the institution. This varies from mergers and 
acquisitions which are aimed at diversity, and will 
effectively increase the staffing of the institution; to 
massive layoffs aimed at creating a leaner more profitable 
institution. The information on the staffing of the bank is 
used to understand whether reorganizations that affect staff 
size have an affect on the institution's profitability. 
b. ESTABLISHING CONTROL GROUPS 
Two control groups were established. The purpose was 
to provide a guide to how the subject bank performed 
relative to other, similar banks. Control Group A is 
comprised of industry peers (see APPENDIX II). The purpose 
. ' 
was to establish an industry average, and to see how the 
subject bank compared to the average. Control Group B is 
comprised of the U.S. Excellent Banks (also see APPENDIX 
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II). These are banks which have been distinguished as 
outstanding performers, banks that truly provide value 
within their industry. These banks are studied in the work 
of Stephen Davis in his books on excellent banks. Key 
variables are provided in Davis' work that will allow for a 
means of comparison. The purpose here is to provide a 
standard of excellence with which to compare the subject 
bank. In this comparison we looked to see if the bank's 
reorganization activity, over the period of the study, 
created a trend moving toward or away from this group of 
superior institutions. 
The difficulty perceived with Control Group A is 
that most of the world's major banks have undergone many 
reorganizations over the past five years. Therefore, when 
comparing our bank to this control group we lacked the 
ability to compare institutions which have not reorganized 
with ones which have. So the comparison with Control Group A 
is on the level of pure industry comparison. That is: How 
well did the subject bank do in comparison with the 
industry? Were the reorganizations of the subject bank more 
or less effective, did they create more or less value, for 
the bank when compared to the industry as a whole (defined 
as U.S. based international banks). The information achieved 
from this comparison is meaningful in terms of the subject 
bank's activity because the reorganization activity should 
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have been aimed at maintaining the value of the subject bank 
within the industry mean, and supposedly bettering that 
mean. 
The same information was gathered on the control 
groups as on the bank we are studying. However; certain 
performance indicator data was only be available on an 
annual basis, this made interim comparisons less powerful. 
c. CREATING COMPARISON INDEXES. 
In order to make the collected data manageable, 
indices were created for each category. 
Stock Price Index: The price of the common stock on the 
date which the study begins represents a value of 1. 
Increases in the stock price increase the index by the 
same percentage as the percentage increase in the 
starting stock price. As an example; if the beginning 
stock price equals $20, and the stock increases the 
next day to $22; then the stock price index will begin 
at 1 and the next day will rise to 1.10. 
Performance index: For the purposes of this index both 
the earnings per share, and the return on assets were 
used. These rates of return are established at the 
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beginning of the study. Quarterly information was used 
to demonstrate the rate of increase or decrease in 
these indices. 
The credit ratings index: Credit ratings established a 
scale of 0-10 with 10 being the highest rating 
achievable. Therefore; a 10 rating is the equivalent of 
AAA+ rating from the Standard & Poor's.(S&P) rating 
agency. The scale declines in synchronization with that 
of S&P so that a rating of 2 on our credit rating index 
equates to a rating of A- from S&P. A rating of 0 is 
used to indicate any rating of less than BBB, the 
lowest investment grade issue. Only one of the banks in 
the study was rated less than BBB, by S&P during the 
period in question. During the time of the BBB- rating 
an index number of -1 was used. 
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AAA+ 10 
AAA 9 
AAA- 8 
AA+ 7 
AA 6 
AA- 5 
A+ 4 
A 3 
A- 2 
BBB+ 1 
BBB 0 
Employee index: An employee index was established using 
a basis of 1. 1 represented the number of total reported 
full time employees at the bank at the beginning of this 
study period. The scale changes on a percentage change 
basis. As an example if the institution had 23,000 
employees at year end 1985, and announced ·the laying off 
of 2,000 employees at the end of 1986, 1 would represent 
23,000 employees. The decrease in this case represents a 
change of 8.6957%. Therefore the scale would now indicate 
.913043. 
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USING THE INFORMATION - MEASURING 
STUDY 1. LOOKING AT THE SUBJECT BANK. 
The information gathered on the subject bank sought to 
establish if there were any relationships in this information 
which would be useful for further analysis. The question asked 
is: Is there a relationship between the percentage change in 
employees, the price of the stock, the number of announced 
major reorganizations and the key performance measures of the 
bank? The analysis consisted of three steps. 
1 establishment of the relationships, through graphs, 
tables, correlation and variance analysis. 
2 - establishment of the relationship between performance 
measures and the stock price, through use of a regression 
model. 
3 - conclusions drawn from the information gained in steps 1 
and 2. 
Step 1 - A table was created that demonstrated whether 
or not there existed a relationship between a reorganization 
announcement and the change in stock price. The price of stock 
was analyzed in conjunction with the announcement of a 
reorganization. The purpose of this comparison was to see the 
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immediate short-term effects of a reorganization,· if any, on 
the price of stock. It provided some view as to what the 
investors think of the announcement. The reason for tracking 
the stock return before and after was to gain a sense of the 
performance leading up to and the after effects of the 
announcement. 
Included in the table are the performance measures of 
the bank from the nearest quarter before the announced 
reorganization and, for the nearest quarter after the 
announced reorganization. The purpose of this was to gain a 
sense of the short-term influences, both immediately before 
and after, the announced reorganization. The table also 
includes the same information for the credit ratings of the 
bank in order to establish if a relationship existed. 
The final part of the table includes the employees of 
the institution and tracks the increase or decrease as related 
to the announced restructuring. 
The results of the table are graphed to display 
visually any relationship among the data being compared. There 
was the expectation of a positive correlation among the stock 
return, credit rating and performance index. The reason for 
this expectation is the intertwined existence of these 
factors. Emanating out from the performance of any business 
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will be its stock performance. As a simplified example, one 
would expect the stock return to rise as a company makes 
profits. Also, the credit ratings are determined by the 
performance measures of the bank by the rating agencies, such 
as Standard and Poor • s. S&P have set performance criteria 
which will lead to the choice of one credit rating or another, 
although there are some other factors which the agencies use 
in their analysis. 
The graph allowed observation, over the five year 
period of the study, to see any cumulative results of 
announced reorganizations. We were seeking to see if a trend 
emerges. 
Sample Table 
Date of Announced 
Reorganization 
Return on Stock Index 
Performance Index 
Credit Rating 
Employees Index 
The graph graphs the trend in the stock price over the 
five year period of the study. Inserted on the graph are the 
dates of the announced reorganizations. The credit ratings 
trend appears as well as the performance index and employees 
index. 
The next step determined any correlation among the 
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announced reorganizations and the performance measures. As it 
was established that there was no correlation an analysis of 
variance was not performed. 
Step 2 The analysis explored the theme that 
reorganizations affect performance measures which affect the 
stock price of an institution. In order to establish a 
relationship between the performance measures and the stock 
price regression analysis was performed using the multiple 
regression program on Microsoft Excell 3.0 for Windows. This 
regression allowed an understanding of nature of the 
relationship. 
The regression model 
SP = a + p, X, + p, X, + p, X, + p, X, 
SP = Stock Price 
a = unexplained or residual 
p, X, = return on assets 
p, X, = return on equity 
p, X, = credit rating 
p, X, = employee index 
where P represents the significance of that variable. 
Step 3 - The final step explored the information 
obtained in 1 and 2 above and determined that reorganizations 
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did not affect the stock price of the institution. 
SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS 
1 Chart and graph for analysis of observation of 
interrelationship of announced reorganizations, stock price 
and performance measures. This is followed by a correlation 
analysis. 
2 - Regression to find relationship of stock price and 
performance measures. 
3 - Association of reorganization and change in stock price. 
Studies 2 and 3, consisted of a detailed comparison 
analysis looking at the subject bank as it measures up to both 
the industry peers and the excellent institutions. 
The final step compared the data from the subject bank, 
Control Group A and Control Group B to determine if a trend 
emerged from this comparison. The questions explored were: 
1 - Did the announced reorganizations appear to have any 
connection with the stock price, performance index, credit 
rating index, employee index? 
2 What, if any were the timing implications of the 
announcement and the reaction of the stock price, performance 
index, credit rating index, employee index? 
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3 - Were there any trends in the performance of the subject 
bank and the reorganizations that were observable and 
measurable? 
4 - Did the number of announced reorganizations appear to be 
influenced by any of the trends of the performance factors? 
5 - Did the announced reorganizations have a measurable impact 
on the subject bank? 
6 - Did the trend of the subject bank appear to be consistent 
with Control Group A? With Control Group B? 
A conclusion about the data was drawn, together with 
recommendations about where future research on this subject 
should go in order to gain a better understanding of the 
social impacts of the reorganizations of the global banking 
indus,try. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE RESULTS 
A. DATA ON MAJOR REORGANIZATIONS 
Manufacturers Hanover Corporations (the Bank, or the 
Company) provided information indicating ten major shifts in 
the organization of the bank during the period studied, 
March 1985 through June 1991. The bank supplied background 
information on these reorganizations in the form of public 
news releases and internal publications which had been 
distributed to staff. While the purpose of the study was not 
to explore the nature of the various reorganizations, a 
brief summary of each is provided here as background. 
April 19, 1985 - Major new structure was announced. 
This announcement heralded the most sweeping change to date 
in the history of the bank. The bank created five business 
sectors, and all units of the bank together with non-bank 
subsidiaries were realigned within these sectors. The 
sectors were created based on the Corporation's five major 
customer groups. The Sectors created were: Investment 
Banking Sector; Asset-Based Financing Sector; Banking and 
International Sector; Corporate Banking Sector; and the 
Retail Banking Sector. 
June 17, 1986 -The Investment Banking Sector was 
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realigned. Seven major business functions were established 
within the sector. The business functions were worldwide in 
terms of scope and responsibility. The functions included: 
Asset/Liability Management; Investment Management; 
Securities Sales and Trading/Treasury Management; 
International Capital Markets; Foreign Exchange; Venture 
Capital; and Leveraged Financing. 
October 15, 1987 - The bank established a Western 
Regional Headquarters. This action consolidated the bank's 
activities on the West Coast focusing on commercial banking, 
investment banking, acquisition finance, factoring, trade 
finance and equipment finance. 
May 1, 1989 - The bank consolidates the CIT 
Group's" factoring unit. Two existing factoring units were 
combined into a single entity for the purpose of becoming 
more efficient and cost effective both in terms of servicing 
and credit controls. 
July 19, 1989 - GEOSERVE was created for all cash 
management services. The purpose was to create a group to 
deliver information and transaction services to customers( 
worldwide. This combined five existing businesses: cash 
• The CIT Group was the Bank's nationwide finance 
company. 
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management, corporate and institutional trust, global 
custody and safekeeping, funds transfer and trade services. 
This unit was made a stand alone profit center. 
September 18, 1989 - The bank restructured its 
capital base. In order to strengthen the institution for the 
future the bank announced four financial steps geared toward 
reducing the financial issues which were plaguing the bank. 
These included: an increase in the third world debt reserve 
by an additional $950 million to $2.4 billion; the sale of a 
60 percent interest in The CIT Group to the Dia-Ichi Kangyo 
Bank, Limited; a private placement of 2.7 million common 
shares; and an announced public offering of $500 million in 
new common shares. 
May 15, 1990 - A major new structure was announced. 
This announcement came as a response to changing markets, 
and for the purpose of increasing flexibility and 
responsiveness to customers. The reorganization was focused 
to redeploy the bank's executives closer to customers. The 
reorganization structured the bank into four groups: Global 
Banking; Regional Banking; Operating Services and Developing 
Markets. 
January 23, 1991 - A new structure was created for 
the Global Banking Group. As a further implementation of the 
May reorganization, the bank restructured the management 
responsibilities of this major group. This included giving 
joint responsibility to some of the executives for the 
operational management of the group. 
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March 20, 1991 - The bank formed a Residential 
Mortgage Corporation. As part of the Regional Banking Group, 
a vertically integrated, full service mortgage banking 
operation which focused on origination, secondary marketing 
and servicing functions was created. This was accomplished 
by the combination of three existing mortgage businesses. 
June 25, 1991 - The bank announced a reorganization 
of the European operations. This included: the formation of 
a European regional headquarters in London; a new structure 
for the bank's London based operations to more closely align 
resources with key market segments; and new management 
appointments to enhance the effectiveness of the new 
structure. 
Another reorganization occurred right after the 
period of the study, when on July 15, 1991 Manufacturers 
Hanover Corporation announced a merger with the Chemical 
Bank, another major international bank. 
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B. Performance Data on Manufacturers Hanover Corporation 
The data was gathered from annual reports for the 
years analyzed, and from financial information sources 
(APPENDIX V). APPENDIX IV summarizes the data of the bank. 
The study was primarily concerned with how the various 
reorganizations impacted the performance of the bank, and 
indices were made in order to easily track changes. The 
purpose of the study was to determine if the restructuring 
activity produced any noticeable impact on the bank's 
performance. Table 4.1 presents the performance data in 
index form. The following pages present a graph of each 
individual performance measure, providing the reader with a 
feel for the range of change over the study period. 
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Table 4.1 
MHC's Stock Price and Performance Measures (Indexed) 
Date Stock ROA EPS Emp. Credit 
Price 
MAR 31' 1985 1. 00 1.00 1. 00 5 
JUN 30, 1985 1.10 1.03 1. 02 5 
SEP 30, 1985 0.95 1.11 1.10 5 
DEC 31, 1985 1.31 1.42 1.16 1.00 5 
MAR 31, 1986 1.56 1.18 1.18 5 
JUN 30, 1986 1.44 1.21 1.20 5 
SEP 30, 1986 1.24 1.24 1.20 5 
DEC 31' 1986 1.26 1.29 1.22 0.94 5 
MAR 31, 1987 1.18 1.16 1.10 4 
JUN 3 0' 1987 1.24 0.00 0.00 4 
SEP 30' 1987 1. 00 1.84 1. 75 4 
DEC 31, 1987 0.60 0.34 0.31 0.91 4 
MAR 31, 1988 0.69 2.03 1.58 2 
JUN 30' 1988 0.84 5.79 4.53 2 
SEP 30, 1988 0.79 2.84 2.22 2 
DEC 31, 1988 0. 79 3.32 2.36 0.73 2 
MAR 31, 1989 1. 00 1. 63 1.16 2 
JUN 30, 1989 1. 02 1.68 1.20 2 
SEP 30, 1989 1.21 0.00 0.00 2 
DEC 31, 1989 0.92 1.08 0.70 0.62 2 
MAR 31, 1990 0.90 1.66 0.99 2 
JUN 30, 1990 0.96 0.58 0.34 2 
SEP 30, 1990 0.61 1.34 0.79 1 
DEC 31, 1990 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.60 1 
MAR 31, 1991 0.71 1.34 0.61 1 
JUN 30, 1991 0.60 1.29 0.59 0.61 1 
The general trend suggested by the analysis of the 
bank's stock price and performance measures revealed an 
overall decline in the bank's performance from both a value 
(as measured by stock price and EPS) and credit perspective. 
The bank did show a significant decline in the employee 
index and, although quite volatile, the ROA revealed an 
overall increase over the period of the study. 
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The objective of the analysis was to explore the 
relationship of changes in the stock price with a 
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reorganization announcement. Chart 4.1 above plots the 
movement of the stock price over the period of the study and 
the dates of the ten announced reorganizations. Analysis of 
this chart does not demonstrate any clear association 
between the reorganizations and the movements in the stock 
price. The stock price analysis showed a decline in value 
over the period from 1 to .60. This is a significant fall in 
value. 
Manufacturers Hanover Corporation 
Performance Chart 
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An analysis of the trend in the bank's ROA revealed 
a positive trend over the period of the study, moving from 1 
to 1.29. This positive trend resulted from better efficiency 
attributed to a focus by the bank on an overall reduction of 
assets and cost control. Examination of this measure 
indicates that it was quite volatile. The period between 
June 1987 and March 1989 was a period when the bank suffered 
huge write-offs, primarily related to the third world debt 
crisis. It was also a period when the bank recognized 
increased income from leveraged buyout lending. 
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This chart provides a summary of the analysis which 
was conducted on the trend of the bank's reported EPS. The 
trend shows an overall loss in the earnings power per share 
of the bank. When compared to the ROA it was determined that 
while both are influenced by the net income of the Company, 
the overall profitability declined despite the improvement 
in the efficiency of the bank. This indicates that the bank 
was successful in reducing assets, but not in increasing net 
income. 
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As part of the cost cutting measures which were 
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undertaken by the institution during the period of the 
study, the number of employees was ~ignificantly reduced. 
This measure declined steadily from 1 to .59. This created 
the positive influence of reducing costs, but does not 
appear to have added to the profitability of the bank. While 
the study did not seek to determine the impact the reduction 
in employees had on profitability, it would be reasonable to 
assume that the reduction in employee cost did support the 
profitability from further decline than that experienced. 
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The credit rating of the bank, as measured by the 
general debt rating of the bank by S&P, showed a continual 
decline in quality over the period. The decline was 
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attributed to several factors including: the exposure of the 
institution to third world debt; the exposure of the bank to 
the Leveraged Buyout activity; and the lack of confidence in 
the future earning power of the institution. 
Table 4 2 . 
C. RELATIONSHIPS OF REORGANIZATION EVENTS 
AND CHANGES IN STOCK PRICE. 
MHC's Stock Price and Performance Measures (Indexed) 
Date Stock ROA EPS Emp. Credit 
Price 
MAR 31, 1985 1.00 1. 00 1. 00 
REORGANIZATION - APRIL 19, 1985 
JUN 30. 1985 1.10 1.03 1.02 
SEP 30. 1985 0.95 1.11 1.10 
DEC 31, 1985 1.31 1.42 1.16 1. 00 
MAR 31, 1986 1. 56 1.18 1.18 
REORGANIZATION - JUNE 17, 1986 
JUN 30, 1986 1.44 1.21 1.20 
SEP 30, 1986 1.24 1.24 1.20 
DEC 31, 1986 1.26 1.29 1.22 0.94 
MAR 31, 1987 1.18 1.16 1.10 
JUN 30, 1987 1.24 0.00 0.00 
SEP 30, 1987 1. 00 1.84 1. 75 
REORGANIZATION - OCTOBER 15, 1987 
DEC 31, 1987 0.60 0.34 0.31 0.91 
MAR 31, 1988 0.69 2.03 1.58 
JUN 30, 1988 0.84 5.79 4.53 
SEP 30, 1988 0.79 2.84 2.22 
DEC 31, 1988 0.79 3.32 2.36 0.73 
MAR 31, 1989 1. 00 1. 63 1.16 
REORGANIZATION - MAY 1, 1989 
JUN 30. 1989 1. 02 1. 68 1.20 
REORGANIZATION - JULY 19, 1989 
REORGANIZATION - SEPTEMBER 18, 1989 
SEP 30, 1989 1.21 0.00 0.00 
DEC 31, 1989 0.92 1. 08 0.70 0.62 
MAR 31, 1990 0.90 1. 66 0.99 
REORGANIZATION - MAY 15, 1990 
JUN 30, 1990 0.96 0.58 0.34 
SEP 30, 1990 0.61 1.34 0.79 
DEC 31, 1990 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.60 
REORGANIZATION - JANUARY 23, 1991 
REORGANIZATION - MARCH 2 0, 1991 
MAR 31, 1991 0. 71 1.34 0.61 
REORGANIZATION - JUNE 2 5, 1991 
JUN 30, 1991 0.60 1.29 0.59 0.61 
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Step 1 of the analysis searched for a relationship 
between the changes in the stock price of the bank and the 
events of announced reorganizations. Table 4.2 provides the 
summary of the activity. The results of this analysis 
revealed mixed results. 
Stock Price: Of the 10 reorganizations which 
occurred over the period of the study, the stock price at 
the end of the quarter was up on seven occasions and down on 
the remaining three. The stock increased an average of 
$11.558, but decreased an average of $24.34. 
ROA: This indicator increased on five occasions 
after an announced reorganization when compared to the 
quarter ending before the reorganization. It decreased on 
the other five occasions. 
EPS: As expected, the EPS results were similar to 
the ROA. This is based on the commonality of the net income 
result in their calculation. 
The Employee Index: This index revealed a decline 
through the entire period. However, it is not possible from 
the data to directly connect the reorganization event with a 
reduction in this indicator. It should be noted that over 
the period of the study the bank was implementing a severe 
cost reduction program which was partially targeted to a 
reduction in staff, primarily through attrition. 
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The Credit Index: This index also revealed a 
declining trend throughout the period. However, no 
downgradings occurred during a quarter in which there was an 
announced reorganization. 
The analysis of the stock price and performance 
measures in conjunction with ~he announced reorganizations 
did not suggest any influence by the reorganizations on the 
performance of the bank. Both from a short term perspective 
and a long term trend, the performance of the bank appeared 
indifferent to announced reorganizations. 
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In order to determine if a relationship existed 
between the changes in stock price of the bank and the 
announced reorganizations, a correlation analysis was 
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performed. This analysis sought a relationship between the 
percentage change in stock price, on a quarter to quarter 
basis, and whether or not a reorganization was announced in 
the quarter. Table 4.3 provides the data which was utilized 
in the correlation analysis. 
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Table 4.3 
% chg Reorg. % chg Reorg. 
Stock Stock 
Price Price 
0.00 0 21.72 0 
9.76 1 -5.39 0 
-13.33 0 -0.44 0 
38.10 0 26.87 0 
18.57 0 1. 74 1 
-7.61 0 18.43 2 
-13.80 1 -23.63 0 
1.4 0 -2.26 0 
-5.82 0 6.56 0 
5.00 0 -36.59 0 
-14.57 0 -3.43 0 
-43.61 1 21.30 2 
15.12 0 -15.61 1 
The correlation analysis revealed: 
Covariance = 0.009650 
Correlation coefficient = 0.083272 
Coefficient of determination = 0.006934. 
(see APPENDIX VII for method of calculation) 
This indicated that the announced reorganizations of 
the bank over the period of the study had no relationship to 
the changes in the stock price of the bank. If the 
reorganizations were meant to assist the bank in increasing 
shareholder value, then they failed to accomplish this task. 
I 
~ 
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This was concluded based on: 
a. The value of the bank as measured by changes in stock 
price declined over the period of the study. The mean change 
per quarter was -0.06%. 
b. There was no determinable relationship between the 
changes in the stock price and the announced 
reorganizations. This is based both on the analysis of the 
correlation between the two variates, and the shorter term 
analysis of end of quarter increases and decreases on the 
stock price and performance measures as displayed in Table 
4.3. 
Chart 4.7 provides the reader with a picture of the 
trends of all the performance data analyzed and the dates of 
announced reorganizations. Analysis of this chart supports 
the conclusion reached above that the reorganizations over 
the period of the study did not provide a positive impact to 
the performance of the bank. In fact, the reorganizations 
did not appear to influence the performance of the bank at 
all. 
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D. RELATIONSHIPS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND STOCK PRICE. 
The relationship between the performance measures of 
ROA, EPS, Number of Employees, Credit Quality, and the Stock 
Price of the bank was also explored. The purpose of this 
analysis was to determine whether or not the performance 
measures which were analyzed could be associated with 
changes in the stock price of the bank. It was thought that 
while reorganizations should have a primary objective of 
improving the stock performance of an organization, the 
reorganizations would address the individual performance 
indicators of the organization. The writer wished to verify 
that the performance indicators effected the movement in the 
stock price of the bank. 
Since it has already been established that the 
reorganization events did not impact the stock price, or the 
performance measures, this analysis is beneficial to 
determine how the stock price would have been impacted if a 
reorganization did affect the performance measures of the 
bank. 
The overall trend in the performance measures has 
been discussed previously in this section and have indicated 
a general decline in the performance of the bank. The trend 
analysis of the stock price indicated a general loss in 
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value over the same period. Chart 4.7 provided a picture of 
the trend of all the measures examined. 
A multi-variate regression was conducted on the 
performance measures. This analysis supported the conclusion 
that the performance measures are good predictors of the end 
of quarter stock price of the institution. 
The regression statistics which resulted were: 
Multiple R 
R Squared 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.8453 
0.7145 
5.6528 
26 
This indicates that there is a strong relationship 
between the performance measures and the stock price. 71.4% 
of the movements of the stock price may be accounted for by 
the changes in the performance measures. 
The analysis explored the theme that; 
reorganizations affect performance measures which affect the 
stock price of an institution. Based on the strong positive 
correlation indicated above, a regression analysis was 
performed in order to better understand the interaction of 
the independent variables upon the dependent variable -
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stock price. This regression allowed for an understanding of 
the nature of the relationship. 
The regression model employed, and indicated in 
chapter 3 was: 
SP = a + ~. X, + ~. X, + ~. X, + ~. X, 
SP = Stock Price 
a = unexplained or residual 
~. X, = return on assets 
~. X, = return on equity 
~. X, = credit rating 
~. x. = employee index 
An analysis of the variance provided: 
Table 4.4 
Analysis of Variance 
df Sum of Mean F 
Squares Square 
Regression 4 1673.1133 418.278 13.1316 
Residual 21 668.6733 31.841 
Total 25 2341.7867 
The hypothesis which this analysis tested was: 
Null Hypothesis: The means of the four variates are equal. 
Hypothesis A: The means of at least two of the variates are 
different. 
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Since the calculated F for this particular problem, 
according to Table 4.4, the ANOVA Table, is 13.1316 and the 
region of rejection of the null hypothesis (F.05(4,21)) is 
2.84", the null hypothesis was rejected. This meant that 
the regression analysis performed was significant for the 
study, and it was concluded that the performance measures of 
the bank did affect the stock price of the bank during the 
period of the study. 
Table 4 5 . 
Coefs. Stand. t Stat. P-value Lower Upper 
Error 95% 95% 
Residual 61.005 12.7544 4. 7830 .00008371 34.480 87.529 
ROA -151.5 482.824 -.3137 .7563501 -1155 852.63 
EPS .01464 1.17018 .12515 .9013987 -2.286 2.5798 
credit 12.43 2. 75926 4.5053 . 0001343 6.6932 18.169 
Employ -.0025 .000821 -3.077 .0050155 -.0042 -.0008 
In further testing, using a two tailed t test of the 
correlation between each variate and the dependent (stock 
price), it was uncovered that both the ROA and EPS had 
extremely low correlation. The t statistic for these 
variates, at an alpha of 5% (.025/.025) dictated the 
acceptance of the null hypothesis as the critical values of 
t for t.025,24 = 2.064. The null hypothesis in each case was 
that the slope of the line was equal to zero. 
• The tables for the F-distribution. and the critical 
values of t, used were from the tables in Introduction to 
Statistic, Wagner, S.F. HarperCollins, 1992. 
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The conclusions drawn from this further testing 
argued that the variates of employee levels and credit 
rating had a much greater influence on the stock price of 
the bank than the ROA or EPS. 
A check of the accuracy of the analysis was 
performed to determine how well the equation worked in 
predicting the value of the stock price. Chart 4.9 provides 
the result of this check, and shows that predicted stock 
price tracked the actual stock price well. 
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Conclusion: A close relationship existed between the 
movements in the bank's stock price and the movements of the 
bank's performance measures. A standard deviation was 
performed on the difference between the actual stock price 
and that predicted by the regression model and was found to 
be 5.0713. 
E. OBSERVATIONS BASED ON THE ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the impact of the bank's 
reorganizations on the stock price showed that the stock 
price was not impacted. The analysis also concluded that 
there was a close relationship between the movement of stock 
price and the performance measures of the institution. As 
stated previously, reorganizations of an institution must be 
targeted to the overall improvement of the organization. One 
of the key measurements of the health of an organization is 
its stock price. Stock price is affected by many variables, 
and a reorganization should be directed at the improvement 
of the stock price by positively altering some of these 
variables. 
It was not possible from the analysis to determine 
any overall positive result of the reorganizations, as 
measured by improvement in stock price. However, the 
analysis did verify that the stock price was influenced by 
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the performance measures of the bank. If the reorganizations 
had positively impacted these performance measures, the bank 
would have increased its stock price. 
F. COMPARISON WITH PEER GROUP AND EXCELLENT BANKS 
While no relationship was discernible between the 
events of reorganization and the bank's performance and 
value, it was considered that the reorganizations may have 
enabled the bank to compete effectively with its peer group. 
This effective competition would have enabled the bank to 
perform equal to or better than the mean performance of its 
peers. A trend analysis was conducted comparing the bank to 
its peer group of u.s. international banks (Control Group 
A) . An analysis was also conducted which compared the bank 
to selected excellent banks (Control Group B) . 
The analysis consisted of collecting data on the 
banks similar to that collected on the subject bank 
(APPENDIX III) . The data was then averaged and indexed to 
allow for comparisons (APPENDIX IV) . The trend analysis 
revealed that the banks within the group performed in 
similar fashion. The subject bank's performance revealed 
similar trends as the control groups. However, the bank's 
performance was weaker than the peer group results, and 
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significantly weaker than the average of the excellent 
banks. 
Analysis of the stock demonstrated that the subject 
bank's stock was more volatile than that of the peer group. 
The following charts provide the summary of the analysis on 
each separate performance indicator. 
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Analysis of the stock price trend shows that the 
subject bank fared worse than its peer group during the 
period of the study. While the general trend of both was 
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downward, the stock price of the subject bank was below the 
average price per share of peer group. A correlation 
analysis was performed to verify the relationship of the 
stock movement of the peer group and the bank. A strong 
relationship was discovered. It was also determined that 
over the period studied the Betab, or measure of volatility 
of the bank's stock was 1.05 (APPENDIX VII). This indicates 
that the return of the bank's stock was more volatile than a 
portfolio of its peers. In comparison with the excellent 
banks, the trend analysis revealed that the excellent banks 
turned in a superior performance. The stock price of the 
excellent banks showed an upward trend, while the peer group 
declined in value. Correlation analysis was also conducted 
to establish the relationship of the bank with the excellent 
banks, and the excellent banks with the peer group. 
SUMMARY OF CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Table 4.6 
Observations Corr. Coef. R-Squared Beta 
Bank on 25 .91906257 .844676 1.04895 
peers 
Bank on 25 .70020568 .490288 .827745 
excellent 
Excellent 25 .85375465 . 728897 .832241 
on peers 
b The Beta of a stock is used to describe the volatility 
of the stock against some portfolio. Beta describes the slope 
of the regression line of the Bank on the peer group. 
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A strong correlation existed between the bank and 
the peer group, and the excellent group and the peer group. 
However, the relationship between the stock price movements 
of the bank and the stock price movement of the excellent 
banks was much weaker. The analysis also revealed that while 
stock price of the bank was more volatile than the peer 
group, it was less volatile than the stock price of the 
excellent group. 
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Analysis of the ROA trend revealed similar trends for 
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all of the banks which were analyzed. The EPS indicator 
demonstrated a like result. The subject bank displayed a 
stronger overall ROA trend over the period than the trend of 
either the peer or excellent group. The reason for this was 
a greater concentration on asset reduction by the subject 
bank during this period. 
The EPS trend comparison exhibited a greater 
decrease in value on the part of the bank than that of 
either group. This supported the conclusion that the bank's 
weaker performance compared to its peers was related to the 
poor profitability of the bank. The excellent group revealed 
higher profitability levels, but did not show superior 
performance in terms of ROA. (See APPENDIX IV for the 
supporting data.) 
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An analysis of the non-performing loans revealed that 
the banks in the excellent group were able to manage their 
loan portfolio well, effectively decreasing the non-
performing loans over the period of the study. The subject 
bank experienced considerable difficulties with its loan 
portfolio, showing a significant increase in non-performing 
loans when compared with its peer group. 
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While both the peer group and the excellent banks 
exhibited relatively stable employment levels, there was a 
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significant decline in absolute levels of employment at the 
bank. As stated previously, the bank's reduction in these 
levels was a result of cost cutting measures. This cost 
cutting, through a drop in employment levels, did not appear 
to be an industry wide event. 
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Virtually all of the banks analyzed experienced a 
decline in credit quality during the period. The one 
exception was Morgan, one of the excellent banks, which 
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maintained the highest credit rating throughout. The subject 
bank suffered a greater decline in quality than that of its 
peer group. 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4 
Chapter 4 has presented the results of the analysis 
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which was conducted on the bank. It has shown and explained 
the data which was gathered, and the results of the 
different comparisons made to gain an understanding of the 
performance of the bank on a stand alone basis, as well as 
on a comparison basis. The analysis did not result in 
establishing an impact on the bank's performance caused by 
the reorganizations of the bank. Chapter 5 discusses the 
conclusions from this analysis and makes some 
recommendations in terms of future research on the subject 
of bank reorganizations. 
Chapter 5 
Answers, Conclusions and Recommendations 
This final chapter answers the questions which were 
posed by the research. It also discusses several possible 
conclusions which may be drawn from the analysis presented 
in Chapter 4. Finally, some recommendations toward future 
research and investigation into the subject of bank 
reorganizations are made. 
A. ANSWERING QUESTIONS 
The research asked several questions in terms of the 
bank's reorganizations and its performance. The questions 
and the answers from the research are summarized below. 
1 - Did the announced reorganizations appear to have any 
connection with the stock price, performance index, credit 
rating index, and employee index? 
The research did not uncover any connection between 
the announced reorganizations and the movements of the 
performance measures or the stock price of the bank. 
2 - What, if any, were the timing implications of the 
announcement of a reorganization and the reaction of the 
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stock price, performance index, credit rating index, 
employee index? 
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No timing implications were uncovered. The research 
had anticipated that the announcement of a reorganization 
would be reflected in the performance of the bank. On a 
short-term basis, it was thought that a positive movement 
would occur consistently in the performance measures at the 
end of the quarter in which an announcement was made. The 
reorganizations did not produce changes in the performance 
of the bank, or changes in trends of the performance 
measures. From the peer group analysis, it would appear that 
the performance of the bank was influenced by that of the 
industry, and not by the reorganizations. 
3 - Were there any trends in the performance of the bank and 
the reorganizations that were observable and measurable? 
The research was not able to establish any 
measurable trends connected to the reorganizations. Over the 
period of the study the value, performance measures and 
credit quality of the bank declined steadily. The 
reorganizations did not appear to have any influence, either 
positive or negative, on the performance of the bank. 
4 - Did the number of announced reorganizations appear to be 
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influenced by any of the performance factors? 
The number of reorganizations became more frequent 
toward the end of the study period. This appears consistent 
with the continuing decline of the stock price and the 
credit quality of the bank. While it can not be objectively 
established, the reorganizations may have become more 
frequent in an attempt to address the profitability of the 
bank, thereby targeted to reverse the trend, and lift the 
stock price. 
5 - Did the announced reorganizations have a measurable 
impact on the bank? 
No impact was discernable from the information 
studied. 
6 - Did the trend of the bank appear to be consistent with 
Control Group A, the peer group? With Control Group B, the 
excellent group? 
The trend analysis revealed consistent movements for 
all groups, with the subject bank underperforming the peer 
group, and the excellent group outperforming both the 
subject bank and the peer group. It may be concluded that 
the performance of the bank was heavily influenced by events 
which impacted the industry. The industry responded in 
similar fashion to these events. 
B. CONCLUSION OF THE RESEARCH 
Three different conclusions may be drawn from the 
results of the research. 
i. The reorganizations were unsuccessful. 
ii. The reorganizations prevented the bank from 
performing worse. 
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iii. The reorganizations were directed at accomplishing 
a goal, or set of goals, other than the 
improvement of the performance of the bank. 
The arguments for the different conclusions are: 
i. The reorganizations were unsuccessful. The 
justification of this conclusion is that 
reorganizations must be focused on the improvement 
of the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
business. The bank improved efficiency to a 
certain degree. However, the cost of the 
improvement was a significant decline in the 
employment levels of the bank. No other 
improvement in the bank's performance could be 
discerned. The bank failed to improve overall 
performance, maintain value, or to maintain a 
performance level equal to its peer group. 
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ii. The reorganizations prevented the bank from 
performing worse. This conclusion argues that if 
the bank had not affected these reorganizations, 
the performance of the institution, over the 
period of the study would have been worse. This 
would have destroyed shareholder value to a 
greater extent than that experienced. As no impact 
was discernible from the analysis performed, this 
conclusion is not supportable. Additionally, the 
bank's performance tracked the direction of its 
peers, albeit underperforming its peers. One would 
have expected to see a counter trend in terms of 
the peer group analysis to support this 
conclusion. In order to establish this conclusion 
research would need to be conducted which would 
recreate the bank's performance as if no 
reorganizations occurred. 
iii. The reorganizations were directed at accomplishing 
a different goal. This conclusion suggests that 
the reorganizations were undertaken to realign 
business based on the competence of management, or 
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to make better use of existing systems technology. 
This conclusion is also hard to support, as 
ultimately the reorganizations should lead to an 
improved performance. 
The writer accepts conclusion the first conclusion: the 
reorganizations were not successful. All reorganizations 
should lead to an improved performance of the institution, 
if this is not ultimately the case it is difficult to 
understand the rationale for reorganizing. The restructuring 
of management and business units, if successful, should 
result in either an increase in the effectiveness or in the 
efficiency of the organization, or both. This increase 
should be discernible in the earnings power of the 
institution. This increase in earning power will lead to 
improvement of the stock price, and therefore an increase in 
shareholder wealth. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research conducted confined its scope to the 
reorganizations of one banking institution over a limited 
period of time. The findings of the research were that the 
reorganizations of that institution were not successful 
because they did not improve the measurable performance of 
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the institution. Future research on this topic is warranted 
and should be directed at a number of outstanding questions 
on this topic. These include: 
i. Why did the reorganizations at Manufacturers 
Hanover prove unsuccessful? Research to address 
this question would involve the study of banks who 
have successfully reorganized several times, and 
compare the differences in the implementation of 
the reorganizations. This would be valuable 
information to provide to the banking industry, 
and would allow for a minimum of unsuccessful 
reorganizations. 
ii. What are the impacts on our society of the effects 
of the reorganizations of the banks? This research 
- may be directed toward gaining a better 
understanding of the impact on the morale of the 
employees of the bank, as their number dwindles. 
The research may also be directed at gaining an 
understanding of the impact on the bank's clients 
as it undergoes multiple reorganizations. 
Continued research is important in this field 
because the global banking industry is in the process of 
undergoing deep and permanent change in the way it does 
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business. Observation of the industry reveals that banks are 
constantly reorganizing in an attempt to become flexible and 
address the changing needs of the client base. In order to 
move toward the future, reorganizations are necessary. 
However, prior to reorganizing a positive impact on the 
performance measures of the bank should be firmly 
established. This may be accomplished through analysis, such 
as simulation. This will minimize the occurrence of 
unsuccessful reorganizations. 
APPENDIX I - PROGRESSION OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
1957 Creation of the European Economic Community (EEC} leads 
to introduction of the EEC unit of account - first 
artificial currency unit of modern times 
1950's (late} Start of Eurodollar market 
1961 Introduction of private European unit of account for 
bond issue by Portuguese company SACOR - the first 
Eurobond? 
1963 Issue of $15 million Eurobond for Autostrade, generally 
considered the start of the Eurobond market 
Introduction of U.S. Interest Equalization Tax (IET} 
sparks growth of the Euromarkets 
1966 Introduction of certificate of deposit in United States 
1968 Creation of U.S. Government National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae} 
1969 Introduction of GNMA pass-through 
1970 First floating-rate note (FRN} in Euromarket 
Creation of U.S. Federal Horne Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac} 
Creation of IMF Special Drawing Right (SDR} 
Introduction of European Currency Unit (private unit of 
account for a Eurobond issue} 
1971 Creation of National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations in the U.S. 
1972 Chicago International Monetary Market (IMM} introduces 
first financial futures contract (currency future} 
NYSE introduces negotiated rates on orders over 
$500,000 
Formation of EEC system of common exchange rates 
•snake' 
1973 Creation of Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Introduction of Eurco (European Composite Unit} in 
Euromarket 
1974 First domestic U.S. FRN 
IET abolished 
u.s. citizens permitted to buy gold 
1975 Deregulation of New York Stock exchange commissions -
Mayday 
Introduction of the first interest rate future (on 
GNMAs} 
1977 Chicago Board of Trade introduces Treasury bond future 
trading 
1978 Creation of U.S. Interrnarket Trading system to link 
stock exchanges 
1979 U.S. 'New Economic Policy• triggers massive interest-
rate instability 
Creation of European Monetary System 
Introduction of ECU 
First revolving underwriting facility in Euromarket 
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1980 Introduction of seven-day-put U.S. municipal bonds 
("lower floaters") 
First partly paid Eurobond (Alcoa) 
First bond issued with debt warrants (Kingdom of 
Sweden) 
1981 First original issue discount/zero coupon bonds 
New, simplified SDR introduced 
First dual-currency bond in Euromarkets 
IBM/World Bank currency swap 
First interest rate swap 
1982 Creation of link between NASDAQ and Intermarket Trading 
System 
First CATs, TIGRs (Certificate of Accrual of Treasury 
Securities, Treasury Investment Growth Receipts) 
First options on Treasury bond futures 
First stock index futures 
First traded currency options 
First adjustable-rate preferred stock 
Foundation of London International Financial Futures 
Exchange 
Rule 415 brings bought deal to U.S. bond markets 
1983 Creation of Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) 
Introduction of options on Standard & Poor's index 
1984 Creation of CARS (Certificates for Automobile 
Receivables) 
Introduction of STRIPS (Separate Trading of Registered 
Interest and Principal) on Treasury bonds 
First money market preferred stock 
First options on Eurodollar futures 
First Eurobond with credit enhancement from an 
insurance company (Rockefeller, guaranteed by Aetna) 
British Telecom issue: perhaps first global Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) 
1985 Introduction of capped FRN; stripped caps 
First mismatch, mini-max and partly paid FRNs in 
Euromarkets 
Introduction of Deutsche mark (DMK) and yen FRNs 
Introduction of nondollar zero coupons (in DM, SwFR, 
and yen) 
Creation of Shogun bonds (US$ bonds in Japan) 
First Sushi bonds (Japanese Eurobonds for domestic 
placement) 
Creation of Tokyo futures exchange 
First variable-duration notes (interest payable in 
bonds) 
First zero-coupon convertible 
Creation of STAIRS (Stepped Tax-exempt Appreciation on 
Income Realization Securities) U.S. zero-coupon tax-
exempts which convert to interest bearing later 
Heaven and hell bonds 
ICONs 
ZEBRA (U.K. zero coupon) 
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US$ harmless warrants (•wedding warrants") 
First synthetic fixed-rate bond (BECS, MECS) 
1986 Harmless warrants in OM, yen, A$, DFL, ECU 
Yen equity warrants 
US$ biannual interest payment 
Hybrid FRN/Euronote 
Capped FRN with income warrants 
Participating mortgage bonds 
Bull floaters, stepped coupon bonds and FRNs 
Step-down floaters 
Deferred coupon bonds and FRNs 
OM collateralized zeros 
Treasury-indexed US$ bonds 
Bear/bull bonds on stock indexes, gold 
US$ oil-indexed bonds 
Reverse floater 
FRN with warrants 
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Foundation of MATIF (French futures exchange: Marche a 
Terme des Instruments Financiers) 
First Stripped U.S. mortgage-backed securities 
Creation of REMICs in U.S. 
First stripped U.S. municipal bonds 
APPENDIX II - CONTROL GROUPS 
Control Group A - Peer Group of Banks 
This group was used in the study to provide a relative gauge 
for the performance of the subject bank. The advantages and 
disadvantages have already been stated in the paper. 
BankAmerica Corporation (BoA) 
Bankers Trust New York Corporation (BT) 
Chase Manhattan Corporation (Chase) 
Chemical Banking Corporation (Chemical) 
Citicorp (Citi) 
Continental Bank Corporation (Cont.) 
First Chicago Corporations (Chicago) 
J.P. Morgan & Company (Morgan) 
Security Pacific Corporation (SecPac) 
Control Group B - Excellent Banks 
Of this peer group two of the banks are considered 
•excellent' banks. These are Bankers Trust Company and 
Morgan Guaranty. These banks were used as a separate control 
group in order to gain a perspective on the performance of 
the best of the industry. 
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Qtr. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
APPENDIX III - INFORMATION ON THE BANKS 
USED IN THE ANALYSIS. 
BankArnerica Corporation 
RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
0.33% 0.63 18.625 
-1.18% -2.34 19.125 
0.16% 0.31 13 
-0.66% -1.27 15.625 6520 51005 
0.16% 0.31 16.5 
-2.23% -4.25 15.625 
0.13% -0.24 10.875 
0.26% 0.44 14.625 5501 53550 
0. 21% 0.34 12 
-4.74% -7.4 11.5 
0.16% 0.25 11 
0.19% 0.27 6.875 4902 59467 
0.39% 0.44 10.75 
0.62% 0.61 13.5 
0.73% 0. 72 16.375 
1.06% 0.97 17.625 4233 53713 
1.08% 1.03 24.375 
1.18% 1.18 26.5 
1. 00% 1. 02 35.875 
1.04% 0.62 26.75 3978 54779 
1. 05% 0.95 28.125 
0.98% 0.92 29.625 
0.99% 1.04 20.25 
1. 00% 0.94 26.5 3116 56349 
0.98% 1.25 36.125 
0.90% 1.16 36.25 3100 55359 
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Banker's Trust New York Corporation 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 0.77% 1.37 31.813 
2 0.76% 1.27 34.813 
3 0.78% 1.37 29 
4 0.73% 1.37 36.75 802 10543 
5 0.88% 1.64 47.375 
6 0.77% 1.45 48.375 
7 0.84% 1. 53 42.875 
8 0.69% 1.39 45.25 875 11069 
9 0.86% 1.77 45.75 
10 -4.05% -7.85 51 
11 1. 03% 2.03 46.25 
12 2.01% 3.7 31.75 1156 12292 
13 0.84% 1. 61 31.125 
14 1.25% 2.18 37 
15 1.12% 2.01 38.875 
16 1.28% 2.29 35 1244 12751 
17 1.07% 2.02 43 
18 1.12% 2.14 48.125 
19 -9.57% -17.39 54 
20 0.69% 1.17 41.375 1351 13230 
21 1.30% 2.36 37.25 
22 1.17% 2.06 41.875 
23 1. 07% 1. 98 31.5 
24 0. 71% 1.4 43.375 1249 13315 
25 1.05% 1.85 42.75 
26 1.20% 2.16 48.375 1123 12701 
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Chase Manhattan Corporation 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 0.50% 1.46 25.75 
2 0.50% 1.44 30.188 
3 0.60% 1. 74 24.563 
4 0.61% 1. 74 36.313 2005 46450 
5 0.58% 1. 63 46.75 
6 0.58% 1.65 44.375 
7 0.55% 1. 55 36.375 
8 0.61% 1. 79 35.625 1924 47480 
9 0.37% 1.12 38.375 
10 -5.63% -16.98 41.25 
11 0.84% 2.55 38.625 
12 0.56% 1. 66 22.125 4366 42390 
13 1. 07% 3.09 25.125 
14 0.87% 2.45 29.875 
15 1.10% 3.09 30.125 
16 1.05% 2.93 28.625 4241 41570 
17 0.45% 1.27 37.875 
18 0.45% 1.31 36.35 
19 -4.26% -12.45 42 
20 0.58% 1.47 34.75 3993 40590 
21 0.09% 0.2 27.875 
22 0.12% 0.24 23.875 
23 -2.46% -5.03 11.75 
24 0.70% 1.32 10.5 4589 38470 
25 0.39% 0.73 15.5 
26 0.44% 0.8 16.25 4470 37340 
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Chemical Banking Corporation 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 0.58% 1.68 37.5 
2 0.68% 2.03 41.25 
3 0.63% 1.8 33.5 
4 0.63% 1.82 45.375 1185 19700 
5 0.69% 1. 93 54.625 
6 0.65% 1.85 51.25 
7 0.66% 1.87 43.375 
8 0.64% 1.92 42.25 1350 21000 
9 0.53% 1.58 43.75 
10 -5.68% -21.34 42 
11 -0.41% -1.12 38.125 
12 1.09% 3.83 21.375 2958 28600 
13 0.56% 1.95 21.375 
14 0.60% 1.98 30.625 
15 1.13% 3.43 32 
16 1.61% 4.66 31 3421 26762 
17 0.53% 1.49 36.125 
18 0.57% 1.65 35.875 
19 -4.45% -12.89 40.875 
20 0.43% 1.04 29.875 3090 29139 
21 0. 72% 1.55 23.375 
22 0.50% 1. 02 25.5 
23 -0.34% -0.69 15.5 
24 0.27% 0.55 10.75 2846 26459 
25 0.47% 0.84 17.375 
26 0.51% 0.83 21.375 3421 22879 
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Citicorp 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 0.68% 1.01 21.625 
2 0.59% 0.9 24.688 
3 0.50% 0.8 20.25 
4 0.52% 0.84 24.688 2248 81300 
5 0.55% 0.93 31.188 
6 0.47% 0.8 29.875 
7 0.49% 0.82 25.063 
8 0.59% 1.01 26.5 2554 88500 
9 0.50% 0.9 25.25 
10 -5.40% -9.48 29.5 
11 1.01% 1. 79 28.688 
12 1.17% 2.06 18.625 6046 90000 
13 0.65% 1.01 19.125 
14 0.65% 1. 03 24.875 
15 0 0 70% 1.13 26.125 
16 1.34% 1.7 25.875 6331 89000 
17 0.93% 1.52 29.75 
18 0.66% 1.11 31.125 
19 0.58% 0.99 33.625 
20 -1.42% -2.52 28.875 7242 92000 
21 0.58% 0.6 23 
22 0.38% 0.64 22.625 
23 0.33% 0.56 14.25 
24 -0.77% -1.26 12.625 8639 95000 
25 0.94% 0.17 14.625 
26 -0.08% -0.12 14.5 8042 90500 
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Continental Bank Corporation 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 0.40% 0.28 34 
2 0.36% 0.28 28.5 
3 0.37% 0.88 28.5 
4 0.55% 0.28 39.5 828 8945 
5 0.40% 0.2 36 
6 0.44% 0.32 26 
7 0.46% 0.32 24.5 
8 0.44% 0.32 21.5 611 9466 
9 0.40% 1.24 20 
10 -5.86% -18.2 21 
11 0.65% 1.92 21.5 
12 -3.06% -9.2 12 716 9624 
13 0.76% 1.12 14.5 
14 0.63% 0.96 20 
15 0.80% 1.2 20.5 
16 1.36% 1.94 20.75 846 8105 
17 0.85% 1.55 21 
18 0.69% 1.27 23.75 
19 0.71% 1. 55 25.375 
20 -0.90% 0.27 19.875 430 7560 
21 0.65% 0.99 15.375 
22 -0.88% -1.05 15.25 
23 0.48% 0.58 7.625 
24 0.37% 0.41 8.875 547 6520 
25 0.30% 0.41 11.625 
26 0.35% 0.41 11.25 574 5787 
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First Chicago Corporation 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 0.32% 0.68 21.25 
2 0.04% 0.08 22.25 
3 0.51% 1.04 21.5 
4 0.54% 1.04 29.5 818 12800 
5 0.60% 1. 06 32.75 
6 0.59% 1.08 32.5 
7 0.66% 1.24 27 
8 0.73% 1.32 28.625 822 13700 
9 0.58% 1.06 28.625 
10 -5.81% -10.96 29.5 
11 0.51% 1.05 28.625 
12 -0.94% -1.86 18.875 1054 14489 
13 1.21% 2.38 23.75 
14 1.04% 2.02 31.375 
15 0.92% 1. 73 33.875 
16 1.17% 2.07 29.625 814 15600 
17 1.04% 1.85 38.125 
18 1.05% 1. 98 41.125 
19 -0.25% -0.5 47.375 
20 0.97% 1. 77 37.125 953 16608 
21 0.49% 0.93 30.375 
22 0.63% 1.22 29.25 
23 0.22% 0.45 17 
24 0.39% 0.75 16.5 854 17441 
25 0.34% 0.63 22 
26 0.41% 0.73 20.875 849 17200 
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Manufacturers Hanover Corporation 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 0.38% 1. 78 35.875 
2 0.39% 1.81 39.375 
3 0.42% 1.96 34.125 
4 0.54% 2.06 47.125 1534 32133 
5 0.45% 2.10 55.875 
6 0.46% 2.13 51.625 
7 0.47% 2.13 44.5 
8 0.49% 2.18 45.125 2135 30316 
9 0.44% 1. 96 42.5 
10 -7.46% -33.32 44.625 
11 0.70% 3.12 38.125 
12 0.13% 0.56 21.5 3277 29125 
13 0.77% 2.82 24.75 
14 2.20% 8.07 30.125 
15 1. 08% 3.96 28.5 
16 1.26% 4.20 28.375 3339 23557 
17 0.62% 2.07 36 
18 0. 64% 2.13 36.625 
19 -4.73% -15.82 43.375 
20 0.41% 1.24 33.125 2930 20034 
21 0.63% 1. 76 32.375 
22 0.22% 0.61 34.5 
23 0. 51% 1.41 21.875 
24 -0.43% -1.23 21.125 3092 19177 
25 0.51% 1. 09 25.625 
26 0.49% 1.05 21.625 3033 19710 
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J.P.Morgan & Company 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 1. 02% 0.92 22.563 
2 0.96% 0.88 25.75 
3 1.20% 1.15 22.25 
4 0.98% 0.95 32.063 1390 14780 
5 1.32% 1.28 39.25 
6 1.29% 1.29 43.938 
7 1.12% 1.14 40.563 
8 0.99% 1. 02 41.25 1523 15500 
9 1.11% 1.22 43.125 
10 -3.16% -3.29 47.875 
11 1.11% 1.18 46.125 
12 1.17% 1.21 36.25 1620 15731 
13 1.36% 1. 52 33.25 
14 1.11% 1.23 38.875 
15 1.13% 1.25 37.625 
16 1.10% 1.38 34.875 1723 15363 
17 0. 71% 0.96 39.75 
18 0.82% 1.12 38.125 
19 -8.54% -9.95 44.875 
20 0.68% 0.82 44 1125 14207 
21 1. 73% 0.86 36.375 
22 0.86% 1. 06 35.75 
23 0.84% 1.08 32.875 
24 0.79% 0.98 44.375 986 12970 
25 1.14% 1.4 46.75 
26 0.93% 1.17 52.125 790 13150 
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Security Pacific Corporation 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 0.56% 0.99 28.375 
2 0.60% 1.01 30.500 
3 0.65% 1.05 25.125 
4 0.86% 1.08 31.875 1326 36022 
5 0. 71% 1. 09 38.625 
6 0.76% 1.12 36.500 
7 0.80% 1.14 33.625 
8 0.72% 1.17 34.625 1304 38384 
9 0.67% 1.22 35.000 
10 -1.10% 1.24 42.000 
11 0.75% 0.52 37.625 
12 -0.22% 0.54 25.375 1954 43005 
13 0.81% 0.00 29.750 
14 0.85% 0.06 36.375 
15 0. 92% 0.86 38.500 
16 0.86% 0.93 36.125 1559 41904 
17 0.91% 1.40 40.125 
18 0.94% 1.46 44.500 
19 0.94% 1.51 48.375 
20 0.90% 1.53 40.625 1643 40882 
21 0.89% 1.57 38.250 
22 0.92% 1.57 37.000 
23 0.64% 1.57 22.500 
24 -1.59% 1.44 20.625 2070 40946 
25 0.43% 0.26 24.625 
26 0.21% 0.05 23.000 2753 38629 
APPENDIX IV - CONTROL GROUP AVERAGES AND INDEXED NUMBERS. 
Averages: The averages were computed based on the number of 
banks analyzed. For Control Group A there were nine banks, 
for Control Gr'oup B there were two. 
The average ROA is calculated based on the average net 
income of the group divided by the average total assets of 
the group. 
The average EPS is calculated based on the total EPS of the 
group divided by the number of banks in the group. 
The average stock price, non-performing loans, and employees 
are calculated on the basis as the average EPS. 
The average credit rating, sums the individual credit 
ratings of each bank, after the rating have been converted 
to an index number, and divides by the number of banks in 
the group. 
Indexed numbers: The indexed numbers, except for the credit 
rating, were calculated by dividing the each number by the 
base period number. The index numbers were not converted to 
a percentage number, that is they were not multiplied by 
100. 
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Control Group A - Peer Group Averages 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 0.58% 1. 00 26.833 
2 0.27% 0.62 28.563 
3 0.56% 1.13 24.188 
4 0.43% 0.87 32.410 1902 31283 
5 0.61% 1.12 38.118 
6 0.18% 0.59 36.493 
7 0.58% 1.04 31.583 
8 0.61% 1.15 32.250 1829 33183 
9 0.56% 1.16 32.431 
10 -4.69% -10.47 35.069 
11 0.67% 1.13 32.951 
12 0.59% 0.25 21.472 2752 35066 
13 0.81% 1.46 23.194 
14 0.80% 1.39 29.167 
15 0. 91% 1.71 30.444 
16 1.20% 2.10 28.833 2712 33863 
17 0.84% 1.45 34.458 
18 0.79% 1.47 36.164 
19 -2.19% -5.35 41.375 
20 0.08% 0.69 33.694 2645 34333 
21 0.79% 1.11 28.889 
22 0.57% 0.85 28.972 
23 0.15% 0.17 19.250 
24 0.05% 0.73 21.569 2766 34163 
25 0.76% 0.84 25.708 
26 0.46% 0.80 27 .111 2791 32616 
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Excellent Bank Averages 
Qtr. RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees 
Price Loans 
1 0.91% 1.15 27.188 
2 0.88% 1.08 3 0. 2 82 
3 1. 03% 1.26 25.625 
4 0.88% 1.16 34.407 1096 12661.5 
5 1.14% 1.46 43.313 
6 1.07% 1.37 46.157 
7 1.00% 1.34 41.719 
8 0.86% 1.21 43.250 1199 13284.5 
9 1.01% 1.50 44.438 
10 -3.54% -5.57 49.438 
11 1.08% 1.61 46.188 
12 1.53% 2.46 34.000 1388 14011.5 
13 1.14% 1.57 32.188 
14 1.17% 1.71 37.938 
15 1.12% 1. 63 38.250 
16 1.17% 1.84 34.938 1483.5 14057 
17 0.85% 1.49 41.375 
18 0.93% 1. 63 43.125 
19 -8.97% -13.67 49.438 
20 0.68% 1. 00 42.688 1238 13718.5 
21 1.56% 1.61 36.813 
22 0.98% 1.56 38.813 
23 0.93% 1.53 32.188 
24 0.76% 1.19 43.875 1117.5 13142.5 
25 1.11% 1. 63 44.750 
26 1. 03% 1. 67 50.250 956.5 12925.5 
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Manufacturers Hanover Corporation - Indexed 
Qtr RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees Credit 
Price Loans 
1 1. 00 1.00 1. 00 5 
2 1. 03 1. 02 1.10 5 
3 1.11 1.10 0.95 5 
4 1.42 1.15 1.31 1. 00 1. 00 5 
5 1.18 1.18 1.56 5 
6 1.21 1.20 1.44 5 
7 1.24 1.20 1.24 5 
8 1.29 1.22 1.26 1.39 0.94 5 
9 1.16 1.10 1.18 4 
10 -19.63 -18.72 1.24 4 
11 1.84 1. 75 1.06 4 
12 0.34 0.31 0.60 2.14 0.91 4 
13 2.03 1.58 0.69 2 
14 5.79 4.53 0.84 2 
15 2.84 2.22 0.79 2 
16 3.32 2.36 0.79 2.18 0.73 2 
17 1. 63 1.16 1. 00 2 
18 1. 68 1.20 1. 02 2 
19 -12.45 -8.89 1.21 2 
20 1.08 0. 70 0.92 1. 91 0.62 2 
21 1.66 0.99 0.90 2 
22 0.58 0.34 0.96 2 
23 1.34 0.79 0.61 1 
24 -1.13 -0.69 0.59 2.02 0.60 1 
25 1.34 0.61 0. 71 1 
26 1.29 0.59 0.60 1.98 0.61 1 
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Peer Group Index Numbers 
Qtr RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees Credit 
Price Loans 
1 1. 00 1.00 1. 00 5.6 
2 0.46 0.62 1. 06 5.6 
3 0.97 1.12 0.90 5.6 
4 0.74 0.87 1.21 1. 00 1. 00 5.3 
5 1.06 1.12 1.42 5.3 
6 0.32 0.59 1.36 5.3 
7 1. 01 1.04 1.18 5.1 
8 1.06 1.15 1.20 0.96 1. 06 5.1 
9 0.97 1.16 1.21 4.8 
10 -8.13 -10.45 1.31 4.8 
11 1.17 1.13 1.23 4.8 
12 1. 01 0.24 0.80 1.45 1.12 4.8 
13 1.40 1.45 0.86 4.1 
14 1.39 1.39 1.09 4.1 
15 1.58 1.71 1.13 4.1 
16 2.08 2.09 1.07 1.43 1.08 4.1 
17 1.45 1.45 1.28 4.4 
18 1.37 1.47 1.35 4.4 
19 -3.80 -5.33 1.54 4.6 
20 0.13 0.68 1.26 1.39 1.10 4.9 
21 1.37 1.11 1. 08 4.7 
22 0.98 0.85 1. 08 4.6 
23 0. 26 0.17 0.72 4 
24 0.08 0. 72 0.80 1.45 1. 09 3.7 
25 1.31 0.84 0.96 3.7 
26 0.80 0.80 1. 01 1.47 1. 04 3.7 
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Excellent Bank Index Numbers 
Qtr RoA EPS Stock Non-perf Employees Credit 
Price Loans 
1 1.00 1. 00 1. 00 8.5 
2 0.96 0.94 1.11 8.5 
3 1.13 1.10 0.94 8.5 
4 0.96 1. 01 1.27 1. 00 1. 00 8.5 
5 1.24 1.28 1.59 8.5 
6 1.17 1.20 1. 70 8.5 
7 1.10 1.17 1. 53 8.5 
8 0.94 1.05 1.59 1.09 1.05 8.5 
9 1.10 1.31 1.63 8.5 
10 -3.86 -4.86 1.82 8.5 
11 1.18 1.40 1. 70 8.5 
12 1.68 2.14 1.25 1.27 1.11 8.5 
13 1.25 1.37 1.18 8.5 
14 1.28 1.49 1.40 8.5 
15 1.23 1.42 1.41 8.5 
16 1.28 1. 60 1.29 1.35 1.11 8.5 
17 0.93 1.30 1.52 8.5 
18 1.02 1.42 1.59 8.5 
19 -9.80 -11.94 1.82 8.5 
20 0.74 0.87 1. 57 1.13 1.08 8.5 
21 1. 70 1.41 1.35 8 
22 1.07 1.36 1.43 8 
23 1.02 1.34 1.18 8 
24 0.83 1.04 1. 61 1.02 1.04 8 
25 1.21 1.42 1. 65 8 
26 1.13 1.45 1. 85 0.87 1.02 8 
7 
APPENDIX V - SOURCES OF DATA. 
The sources used for the data included: 
a. The annual reports of the banks analyzed for the years 
ending; 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 an 1991. 
b. News releases from Manufacturers Hanover Corporation for 
the dates of the announced reorganizations. 
c. The credit rating information was obtained from the 
Standard & Poor's Rating Agency. 
d. The stock prices were supplied courtesy of CIBC, New York 
Branch. 
114 
APPENDIX VI - DEFINITIONS OF CERTAIN TERMS 
Beta: The relationship between an investments return and 
that of the market (or a portfolio) returns. 
Bond: A long-term (typically ten years or more) promissory 
note. 
Commercial paper: Short-term unsecured promissory notes sold 
by businesses in order to raise cash. 
Correlation coefficient: Measure of the degree of comovement 
of two variables. 
Earnings per share (EPS): A measure of each common share's 
claim on earnings, defined as earnings available for common 
shares divided by the number of common shares outstanding. 
Net income: The excess of revenues over all related expenses 
for a given period. 
Leveraged buyout (LBO) : Purchase of a company financed in 
large part by company borrowings. 
Return on assets (ROA) : A measure of the productivity of 
assets, defined as income divided by total assets. 
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Trend analysis: An analysis of a firm's financial 
performance over a period of time. 
Volatility: p - risk. 
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APPENDIX VII - DESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN CALCULATIONS 
I. The correlation coefficient used was determined by the 
following steps. 
Step 1. The covariance of A on B was established by: 
i. determining the mean of A and B, 
ii. multiplying the return of A less the mean of 
A by the return of B less the mean of B, 
iii. summing the results of ii., 
iv. dividing the total of iii., by the number of 
observations. 
Step 2. Once the covariance was established the 
coefficient was then calculated by dividing the 
covariance by the standard deviation of A times the 
standard deviation of B. 
II. The coefficient of determination was calculated by 
squaring the coefficient of correlation. 
III. Beta was calculated by dividing the covariance by the 
standard deviation of B. This determined the slope. 
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